


























































It is well known that proposers have an advantage in the canonical
model of bargaining in legislatures: proposers are sure of being part
of the coalition that forms, and, conditional on being in a coalition, a
player receives more as a proposer than as a coalition partner. In this
paper I show that, if parties di¤er in voting weight, it is possible for a
party to donate part of its proposing probability to another party and
be better-o¤ as a result. This can happen even if the recipient never
includes the donor in its proposals. Even though actually being the
proposer is valuable, having a higher probability of being proposer may
be harmful.
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11 Introduction
A donation paradox occurs when a player transfers an apparently valuable
prerogative to another player but is better-o¤ as a result (Kadane et al.,
1999). The donation paradox in power indices was identi…ed by Felsenthal
and Machover (1995). A power index exhibits the donation paradox when
it is possible for a player to increase its power (as measured by the index)
by donating part of its weight to another player. Felsenthal and Machover
(1998, p. 258-259) see the donation paradox as something that should not
occur for measures of what they call P-power (the voter’s expected share in
a …xed purse that is divided by voting).
In this paper, I identify a donation-type paradox that arises as an equi-
librium phenomenon in the context of legislative bargaining. The most in-
‡uential model of bargaining in legislatures is due to Baron and Ferejohn
(1989). In this model,  parties must divide a budget by majority rule. The
parties have opposed preferences in the sense that each party would like to
have the whole budget for itself. One of the parties is randomly selected
to make a proposal, and the remaining parties accept or reject. Being the
proposer is valuable in this model: the proposer is guaranteed to be in the
coalition that forms and, conditional on being part of the coalition, a player
gets more as a proposer than as a responder. Baron and Ferejohn analyze
simple majority rules with symmetric voters, but the proposer advantage
occurs for any distribution of votes and any quali…ed majority as long as no
player has a monopoly on making proposals and there are no veto players
(see Harrington 1990, proposition 1; Okada 1996, theorem 1; Montero 2006,
corollary 3). When each player has one vote, having a higher probability of
being proposer can never hurt a player (Eraslan (2002)). The present paper
shows that, if players have di¤erent weights, it may be possible for a player
to gain from donating some of its proposing probability to a recipient and
be better-o¤. This can happen even though the recipient never includes the
donor in its proposals (either before or after the donation). The e¤ect is
triggered by the fact that the donor is disproportionately likely to receive
proposals by third parties after the donation.
22 The model
2.1 Weighted majority games
Let  = f1g be the set of players.  µ  ( 6= ?) represents a
generic coalition of players, and  : 2 ! R with (?) = 0 denotes the
characteristic function. We have a weighted majority game i¤ there exist
 nonnegative numbers (weights) 1 and a nonnegative number 
such that () = 1 if
P
2  ¸  and 0 otherwise. A coalition  is called
winning i¤ () = 1 and losing i¤ () = 0. It is called minimal winning
i¤ () = 1 and () = 0 for all  such that  ½ . The set of all winning
coalitions is denoted by . A player who belongs to all winning coalitions
is called a veto player.
A weighted majority game admits a homogeneous representation if there
exists a vector of nonnegative numbers 
1
 and a nonnegative number




2.2 The bargaining procedure
Let () be weighted majority game. We interpret this game as a trans-
ferable payo¤ game where  players decide by majority rule on the division
of a (perfectly divisible) budget.
Bargaining proceeds as follows: At every round  = 12 Nature selects
a player randomly to be the proposer according to some probability distri-
bution  = ()2, where  ¸ 0 for all  and
P
2  = 1. The selected
player proposes a payo¤ vector ()2. This payo¤ vector must be feasible
(
P
2  · 1) and no player can receive a negative payo¤ ( ¸ 0 for all  in
). Given a proposal, all players vote "yes" or "no " sequentially (the order
does not a¤ect the results). If the total number of votes in favor is at least
, the proposal is implemented and the game ends. Otherwise the game
proceeds to the next period in which Nature selects a new proposer (always
with the same probability distribution). Players are risk-neutral and share
a discount factor  · 1
The probability  is player ’s recognition probability. Two common
assumptions are equal recognition probabilities ( = 1
 for all  in ), and
3(for weighted majority games) proportional recognition probabilities,  =

() for all  in .




-th round strategy of player , prescribes
1. A proposal ()2
2. A response function assigning ”yes” or ”no” to all possible proposals
of the other players.
Players are free to condition their actions on the history of the game up
to time ; however we will study equilibria in which they choose not to do
so. The solution concept is stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE).
Stationarity requires that players follow the same (possibly mixed) strategy
at every round : the probability that the proposer makes a given proposal
is the same for all  regardless of history, and the response function depends
only on the current proposal and not on what happened in previous rounds.
Given an SSPE ¤ we will denote the associated expected payo¤ for
player  (computed at the beginning of the game, before Nature chooses the
proposer) by (¤) -we will drop ¤ to simplify notation-. The expected
payo¤ given that a proposal is rejected is called the continuation value. Con-
tinuation values play a very important role in any SSPE: because incredible
threats are ruled out by subgame perfection, a responder must accept any
payo¤ strictly higher than their continuation value. Moreover, when the
equilibrium is stationary the continuation value is the same at all subgames
for given ¤: after a proposal is rejected a period elapses and the players do
the same they would do at time 1 all over again, thus player ’s continuation
value is simply .
2.3 The proposer advantage
The proposer advantage was originally established by Baron and Ferejohn
(1989) and Harrington (1990) for symmetric games. Because of symmetry,
each player expects 1
 if the game goes to the next period. Since the proposer
needs only to convince  ¡ 1 players to vote for the proposal, it can o¤er 1






 . Thus there
is a proposer advantage as long as   . Introducing discounting leads
4to an even greater proposer advantage. Okada (1996) shows that there is a
proposer advantage in general games assuming that each player is recognized
with probability 1
 and   1. This result can be easily generalized to any
recognition probabilities and to  = 1 provided that no player has veto power
or a recognition probability equal to 1 (if a player has veto power, there is
still a proposer advantage if   1).
Lemma 1 Let [;] be a weighted majority game. If there are no veto
players and no player with  = 1, then there is a proposer advantage in
the sense that a player earns strictly more as a proposer than as a coalition
partner in an SSPE. The requirement of no veto players can be replaced by
  1.
Proof. Let  be the expected equilibrium payo¤ for player . In a
stationary equilibrium a player has the same  in each period and, since
there is 1 unit to divide,
P
2  · 1.
Any player with   0 must have   0. As a proposer, player 
can always exclude some  with   0 and o¤er everybody else slightly
more than their continuation value; the proposal will pass as  is not a veto
player.1 Since
P
2nfg   1, it follows that  has a positive payo¤ as a
proposer. Moreover, given that no player can be allocated a negative payo¤
as a responder, any player with a positive recognition probability must have
a positive expected payo¤ overall.









This is because a player must accept any o¤ers above . If o¤ers
were above , the proposer could undercut the o¤er slightly and it would
still be accepted. Thus  must receive exactly  as a coalition partner,
and the proposer receives 1 ¡
P
2nfg  for some . If  were not the
1If there was no  with   0 it would be even easier for  to have a positive payo¤ as
a proposer by o¤ering all players slightly more than 0.
5solution to the minimization problem, there would be another coalition that
could be proposed with coalition partners getting slightly more than their
continuation value; they would have to accept and the proposer would be
better-o¤.
The di¤erence between proposer and coalition partner payo¤ is 1 ¡

P
2 . This is always positive because, since no player has a monopoly
on making proposals there is at least one player  6=  who can make pro-
posals (and will therefore have   0) and since there are no veto players
that player can be excluded.
The requirement of there being no veto players can be replaced by   1.
Then there must be a proposer advantage because the sum of the continu-
ation values of all players is strictly less than 1.
If a player has a monopoly on making proposals the advantage of being
proposer is not de…ned.
3 A new donation paradox
Suppose there are four parties in the legislature, controlling 3, 2, 2 and 1
votes respectively, and 5 votes are needed to pass a proposal. We consider
two possible scenarios: each party is recognized with a probability propor-







), or alternatively each party








are plausible: in the …rst case, we can think of a voter with three votes as a
party composed of three members, each of them with one vote, who always
follow party discipline, and each member is selected with equal probability;
in the second case, we can think of parties as being treated equally in terms
of voice even though they have di¤erent numbers of votes. Because the
medium-size players have the same recognition probability in both scenar-
ios, we can view the move from one scenario to the other as the large player
"donating" some of its recognition probability to the small player.
Eraslan and McLennan (2006) show that all SSPE have the same ex-
pected payo¤s, therefore if we are only interested in payo¤s and not in
strategies it is enough to …nd one equilibrium.
6Note that players of the same type must have the same payo¤ in equilib-
rium if they have the same recognition probability (Montero, 2002, lemma
2). This result also follows from Eraslan and McLennan’s uniqueness result
(if equilibrium payo¤s are unique they must be symmetric). Thus, we can
set 2 = 3 and use 2 to denote both player 2 and player 3’s payo¤s. We
will also focus on equilibrium strategies that are symmetric in the sense that
the two players of the same type play the same strategy, and are treated
symmetrically by other players’ strategies.
What coalitions do players propose in equilibrium? The answer is straight-
forward for the largest and the smallest player.
The large player always proposes f12g or f13g (each with probability
05 since we focus on symmetric strategies). The small player is of no use to
the large player as a coalition partner: adding the small player to a coalition
that already contains the large player never turns a losing coalition into a
winning one.
Similarly, the large player is of little use to the small player as a coalition
partner. The natural coalition for the small player to propose is the only
minimal winning coalition to which it belongs, f234g. A coalition like
f124g could conceivably be proposed if 1 · 2, but this is never the case
for the recognition probabilities we consider.
As for a medium-size player like player 2, it can propose coalition f12g or
coalition f234g, depending on how 1 compares with 2+4. If 1 = 2+4
we have a competitive situation in the sense that players that can replace
each other in a minimal winning coalition receive the same payo¤.

















Proof. Suppose the large player proposes to each medium-sized player
with probability 05, the small player proposes to both medium-sized players,
and each medium-sized player randomizes between proposing to the large
player (with probability ) and proposing coalition f234g (with proba-
bility 1 ¡ ). Suppose moreover that each coalition partner is o¤ered its
7continuation value (so, for example, player 2 proposes (11¡100)), and
players accept any o¤er that gives them at least their continuation value.
Note that a mixed strategy can only be optimal for a medium-sized player
if 1 = 2 + 4. The following system of equations determines the expected






























1 = 2 + 4
The solution to this system is 1 = 5
14, 2 = 4
14, 4 = 1
14 and  = 1
2.
The strategies described above constitute an equilibrium because respon-
ders are o¤ered their continuation values, and proposers are proposing to
the cheapest possible coalition partners.

















Proof. Suppose the large player proposes to each medium-sized player
with probability 05, the medium-size players propose to the large player, and
the small player proposes to both medium-sized players. Suppose moreover
that each coalition partner is o¤ered its continuation value (so, for example,
player 2 proposes (11 ¡ 100)) and players accept any o¤er that gives
them at least their continuation value. Then continuation values are found
























The solution to this system of equations is 1 = 3
8, 2 = 2
8 and 4 = 1
8.
8The strategies described above constitute an equilibrium because respon-
ders are o¤ered their continuation values, and proposers are proposing to the
cheapest possible coalition partners. In particular, a medium-sized player
would compare proposing to the large player (and paying 3
8) with proposing
to the other two players (and paying 2
8 + 1
8 = 3
8). Because the alterna-
tive coalition is no better than the one that is being proposed, there is no
pro…table deviation.
What is the e¤ect of the donation from player 1 to player 4? The direct
e¤ect is negative: player 4 always proposes coalition f234g, so if players
did not change their strategies it would be the case that 2 would go up (as
the medium-sized players receive more proposals), 4 would go up (as the
small player is more likely to be recognized) and 1 would go down (as the
large player is less likely to be recognized). But then it would no longer be
optimal for players 2 and 3 to play a mixed strategy, as 1  2 +4. In the
new equilibrium, the medium-sized players are more likely to propose to the
large player than before. This indirect e¤ect (the large player is more likely
to receive proposals from the medium-sized players) brings the equilibrium
back to a competitive situation in which 1 = 2 + 4. Nevertheless, the
individual values of 1, 2 and 4 are not the same as before, and player 1
is better-o¤ in this new competitive equilibrium.
More generally, there is a range of probabilities such that player 1 can
move from a competitive allocation to another competitive allocation that is
more favorable by donating some probability to player 4. Fix the probability
of being proposer for a medium-size player at 1
4, and let  be the probability
that the large player is selected to be proposer; then the small player is
selected with probability 1
2 ¡ If we only consider recognition probabilities
such that a larger player cannot be selected less often than a smaller player,
the relevant range of values for  is 1
4 ·   1
2. It turns out that the
equilibrium is always such that a medium-size player is indi¤erent between
proposing to the large player and proposing to the other medium-size player
and the small player, or equivalently 1 = 2 + 4. Let  be the probability
that a medium-size player proposes to the large player. Then expected
9payo¤s are found from the following equations






























1 = 2 + 4
The solution for  is 2(1¡2). It starts at 1 for  = 1
4, and is approaches 0
when  approaches 1
2. This is intuitive: if a player is less likely to be proposer
with strategies being unchanged, it becomes cheaper and will receive more
proposals. What is surprising is the overcompensation, so that the player is
better-o¤ when it is less likely to be proposer. It turns out that 1 =
2(1¡)
5¡4 ,
which is decreasing in . Payo¤s for the other two types are 4 = 1¡2
5¡4
(which is decreasing in  as one would intuitively expect; the direct e¤ect
of the donation is stronger than the indirect e¤ect), and 2 = 1
5¡4 (which
must be increasing in  since the other payo¤s are decreasing in ).
4 Discussion
It is known that the indirect e¤ect can o¤set the direct e¤ect. Montero
(2002) shows that, for apex games and symmetric protocols, all values 0 
1 · 05 lead to the same expected payo¤s. If the apex player becomes the
proposer more often, it receives proposals less often so that the competitive
solution 1 = ( ¡ 2)2 is maintained.
An important di¤erence between the game [5;3221] and apex games
is that the competitive payo¤ vector is unique for apex games because apex
games have a unique homogeneous representation (up to rescaling). The
indi¤erence condition 1 = ( ¡ 2)2 together with 1 + ( ¡ 1)2 = 1
determines expected payo¤s uniquely.
The game [5;3221] has many competitive payo¤ vectors because it
has many homogeneous representations, so that assuming that the out-
come is competitive does not lead to a unique payo¤ vector. For exam-
ple, [7;4331] is a homogeneous representation of the same game. If we
10normalize the weights so that they add up to 1, it is easy to compute all
homogeneous representations. Clearly, players 2 and 3 must have the same
weight in any homogeneous representation. Denote the weights by 1, 2
and 4 respectively. Normalization implies that
1 + 22 + 4 = 1 (1)
Homogeneity implies that 1 + 2 = 22 + 4, or
1 = 2 + 4 (2)
Note that the homogeneity condition is the same as the indi¤erence
condition that we obtained previously for a medium-sized player, but with
weights instead of payo¤s. Solving this system we obtain
2 = 1 ¡ 21 (3)
4 = 31 ¡ 1 (4)
It turns out that 2 is negatively related to 1, whereas 4 is positively
related to 1.
Since f14g and f23g are losing coalitions, there are two additional
constraints: 2  4 guarantees that f14g is losing, and 4  0 guarantees
that f23g is losing. Taking these constraints into account we …nd that any
value 1 such that 1
3  1  2
5 leads to a homogeneous representation
(the corresponding intervals for the other two players are 1
3  2  1
5 and
0  3  1
5).
If we assume a ”competitive” equilibrium in which 1 = 2 + 4 (equiv-
alent votes receive the same payo¤), expected payo¤s must be proportional
to some homogeneous representation, and the payo¤s of 1 and 4 must vary
together. This goes some way towards explaining the phenomenon (if a
donation from 1 to 4 a¤ects 1 and 4 it must have a paradoxical e¤ect)
though it does not explain why payo¤s change when 1 donates probability
to 4 instead of remaining constant.
115 Concluding remarks
Being recognized as a proposer is always a good thing ex post. However,
having a higher recognition probability can hurt a player. The reason is
that the indirect e¤ect of this donation may outweigh the direct e¤ect: the
recipient is now less likely to receive proposals, and that e¤ect more than
compensates for the increase in the recognition probability.
In the example the paradox seems to be connected to the fact that the
set of minimal winning coalitions is not rich enough, so that the homoge-
neous representation of the game is not unique. Identifying a class of games
for which the paradox does not occur (besides apex games) would be an
interesting topic for future research.2
2To the best of my knowledge, there are no general results on the comparative statics
of changing recognition probabilities. Kalandrakis (2006) shows that any expected pay-
o¤s can be obtained for some recognition probabilities, but contains no claims on what
probabilities lead to what payo¤s.
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